Gender, Work, and the NAFTA
Labor Side Agreement
By

KATE

E.

ANDRIAS*

IT HAS BEEN nearly ten years since the public debate over the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the advent of trade
liberalization with America's neighbors to the north and south. In the
years since NAFTA's signing in 1993, economic globalization has fundamentally changed our conception of the nation-state, citizenship,
trade, and work.1 Economic life in the United States now involves massive cross-border capital and labor flows, and integrated cross-border
production chains, particularly with our trading partners in NAFTA.2
We have seen greater trade liberalization throughout the world, the
ascendance of transnational organizations like the World Trade Organization, recurrent discussions about expanding NAFTA, political
negotiations around the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and
most recently, Congress' decision to allow President George W. Bush
"fast-track" trade authority.
I.

Introduction

We have also witnessed increasing public protests regarding the
terms and conditions of globalization in places such as Seattle, Genoa,
Washington, D.C., and France.3 Labor unions, human rights activists,
environmentalists, and students across the world have become increasingly organized and vocal in their opposition to the crafting of inter* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, May 2004. Former Area Director, New England
Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, Service Employees International Union. The
author would like to thank Judith Resnik, Vicki Jackson, Gia Kim, and Nicholas Allen for
their helpful comments.
1. For a discussion of changing notions of citizenship see Linda Bosniak, Denationalizing Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES & PRACTICES 237 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001).
2. See Lucy A. Williams, Property, Wealth and Inequality Through the Lens of Globalization:
Lessonsfio7n the United States and Mexico, 34 IND. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2001).
3. For a history of citizen movements to affect trade see SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON,
TAKING TRADE TO THE STREETS: THE LOST HISTORY OF PUBLIC EFFORTS TO SHAPE GLOBALIZA-

TION xiii (2001).
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national trade rules without democratic participation, transparency,
or accountability.4 As recently as April 2002, over one million people
gathered in Rome to protest proposed changes to labor law brought
5
on by globalization.
Although self-identified women's rights groups in the United
States have not, as of yet, been at the forefront of these popular movements, and although American labor organizations have not effectively focused on the gendered effects of economic liberalization or
on building women-led worker organizations, globalization of trade
and the ever-deepening hemispheric economic integration under
NAFTA have a particular impact on women. Women, especially women of color, are the most exploited laborers in the global economy
generally, and in North America specifically. Women predominate
among maquiladoras in export-processing zones in Mexico and in
sweatshops in the United States.6 Female laborers, such as office
cleaners and chambermaids in luxury hotels, support the American
institutions of international finance, in today's "global cities."'7 As a
result of global restructuring, women participate as labor migrants
both by traveling within their countries to export processing zones
and by leaving their home countries to work as domestic laborers,
farm workers, janitors, child-care workers, food service providers, and

4. Scholars have noted that this is not the first period of global economic, political,
and social integration in our nation's history, see, e.g., DANI RODROK, HAS GLOBALIZATION
GONE TOO FAR? (1997), nor is it the first time there has been popular protest over stich
trade policies. For example, Susan Aaronson notes the similarity between activists in Seattle
in 1999 and American colonists in Boston in 1773 who organized to affect Great Britain's
trade policies. See AARONSON, sunpra note 3, at xiii.
5. See Melinda Henneberger, Millions of Italians Take to the Streets in a General Strike,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A3.
6. See Sherri M. Durance, American Maquiladoras:Are They Exploiting Mexico s Working
Poor, 25 KAN. J.L. & Putt. Poi'v 131 (1994) (reporting that in some areas as many as threequarters of maquiladora employees throughout the world are female); Jennifer H. Lee &
Catherine Powell, Recognizing the Interdependence of Rights in the Antidiscrimination Context
Throngh the World Conference Against Racism, 34 COLUM. HUm. RTS. L. RI~v. 235, 252
(2002) (discussing the predominance of immigrant women of Latino and Asian descent in
the United States garment factories and sweatshops); Karen F. Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker Rights Provisions in the U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. 1NT'L LAw 173, 174,
190-94 (1992) (noting that women make Up a majority of the employees in Mexican maquiladoras, though their presence has declined as a percentage of the total workforce);
Williams, supra note 2 at n.10.
7. Saskia Sassen, 70oward a 'eminist Analysis of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
L-GAL STun. 7 (1996), reprinted in SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND Is DISCONTENTS 81
(1998).
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health care workers.8 Globalization and economic restructuring have
also brought increased trafficking of women in sexual slavery."
In 1994, the United States, with Canada and Mexico, signed the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), a
side agreement to NAFTA. 1° The agreement sets forth eleven labor
principles, including equal pay for men and women, non-discrimination, and the right to organize, and requires the three signatory governments to enforce their own labor laws. NAALC was borne of
intense protests on the part of organized labor and other civic groups
in America during the NAFTA debates. While many trade unionists,

environmentalists, and consumer and human rights groups have been
critical of the negotiated side agreement, NAALC represents the first
time in the modern trading era that an international agreement on
labor was linked both politically and legally to a trade agreement.''
8. See Joan Fitzpatrick & Katrina R. Kelly, Gendered Aspects of Migration: Law and the
Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 84 (1998) (discussing female migration trends and noting that, "[t]he female migrant's compelling story has gone largely
unheard.... However, globalization of the economy, easing of transportation barriers and
continued disparities in wealth between the South and the North have stimulated migration and heightened its profile in both developed and developing states."); see also Hope
Lewis, Universal Mother, TransnationalMigration and the Human Rights of Black Women in the
Americas, 5J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 197, 201 n.16 (2001); SASSEN, supra note 7, at 81. While
current globalization has brought new forms of female migration, there is a long history of
women migrant laborers. See, e.g.,
MARY H. BLEWE-r, WE WILL RISE IN OUR MIGHT: WORKINGWOMEN'S VOICES FROM NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (1991) (describing the mi-

gration of women in nineteenth century America to shoe production towns in New
England); CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLAss IN NEW YORK, 1789-1860

(1986) (describing nineteenth century gender relations in New York City, including the
experiences of woman migrants); Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, Survival Strategies Among AficanAmerican Workers, in WOMEN, WORK AND PROTEST 139, 141 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985) (dis-

cussing African-American women's migration from rural to urban areas, and from farm
labor to domestic labor in the early part of the twentieth century).
9. See Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 8, at 108. For a discussion of the trafficking of
women and contemporary sexual slavery, see KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 34-79 (1999) (describing sexual slavery in Thailand); Liz
KELLY

&

LINDA REGAN, STOPPING TRAFFIC: EXPLORING THE EXTENT OF AND RESPONSES TO

TRAFFICKING IN

WOMEN

FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

IN

THE

UK (2000); Shelley Case Inglis,

Expanding International and National Protections Against Trafficking for Forced Labor Using a
Human Rights Framework, 7 BUrr. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 55 (2001); see also KATHLEEN BARRY,
FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979) (providing one of the earliest and most influential exami-

nations of trafficking and forced prostitution).
10. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/infocentre/NAALC.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003) [hereinafter NAALC].
11. See Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor CooperationAgreement Among Mexico, Canada and
the United States: Its Negotiationand Prospects, 3 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 121, 121 (1995). While NAALC
was the first explicit labor side agreement, labor standards have long been an issue in trade
policy debates in the United States. The Framers of the United States Constitution debated
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This agreement has great relevance to the lives of workers generally, and women workers in particular, as it potentially creates a new
space for civic participation, one in which to advocate for labor rights
and women's equality in Mexico, Canada, and the United States. In
the future, the labor side agreement could have even greater significance if NAFTA is extended to other nations in the hemisphere.
Given the gendered nature of economic restructuring, however, it is
important to ask: Where were women's voices and organizations and
where were concerns about gender in the debate? What does NAALC
offer women workers? How effective has it been at protecting the
rights of workers generally and women workers in particular, and at
helping them achieve recognition as independent commercial actors
with control over their own working conditions? And, as we move towards greater trade liberalization, for what should those concerned
about inequality broadly, and gender inequality specifically, advocate?
In Part II of this Article, I examine the connection between gender and economic globalization. I argue that labor rights and women's equality cannot be separated, nor can they be viewed as solely
local problems with a domestic solution. Part III analyzes the public
debate surrounding the passage of NAALC. It demonstrates that gender was largely missing from the public discourse, as American women's groups failed to mobilize effectively around the issue, and as
American unions, taking a protectionist stance, failed to focus on the
rights of women workers. As a result, the agreement that emerged did
not address issues of gender and labor to the extent it might have.
Part IV examines the labor side agreement itself, and attempts to enforce it, through a gender lens. It shows that although the labor side
agreement has expressive value, NAFTA ultimately privileges free
trade over workers' rights and this has particular consequences for
women. Part V argues that while NAALC is flawed as an instrument for
protecting the rights of women workers, it is critical that those concerned about equality not abandon efforts at creating new labor rights
agreements and improving provisions such as NAALC: such provisions
are essential to the existence of democracy, labor rights, and gender
equity in an increasingly transnational economy. I take the position
that this effort must emphasize the development of institutional structures through which women workers, as well as all workers, can articuthe implications of slave labor and the slave trade on the new nation. Advocates have long
pressed for labor standards to be added to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), which currently only bans trade in goods made by forced labor. See AARONSON,
supra note 3, at 22-23.
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late their own priorities. That is, I argue that the focus should be on
protecting the rights of workers to organize.
i.

Inseparability of Gender, Work, and Globalization

Why focus on the connection between gender and NAALC, a relatively obscure side agreement to NAFTA? Such an examination is important both for those concerned about women's equality and for
those concerned about free trade, the shape of the emerging global
economy, and democracy.
Although many state and federal statutes, including Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act, are explicitly concerned with gender discrimination at work, too often the myriad problems facing women are framed
in our current legal regime as not "economic in nature.'12 Yet, economic structures and conditions are central to women's equality and
freedom. Crucial to any discussion of equality for women, is the recognition of women as workers, paid and unpaid, and an examination of
women's efforts to attain full economic citizenship rights.1"
A brief look at labor statistics reveals the highly gendered nature
of work, economic power, and poverty. In general, women's participation in the paid labor force has been rising for several decades and in
most industrial nations has reached at least 60%, while male participation rates have dropped.1 4 Women universally perform a disproportionate amount of the world's work for a very small share of the
world's resources.' 5 Women make up 45% of the world's workforce,
but they constitute 70% of the one billion poorest citizens. 16 Third
12. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); see alsoJudith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) (discussing the
Supreme Court's recent decision categorizing the problem of violence against women as
"local" and "non-economic" and holding that the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutionally encroached on states' rights). Professor Resnik points out that the Morrison Court's
categorization of violence against women as "noneconomic" is indefensible given both (1)
the painful irony that "the Supreme Court has many times acknowledged that women can
be treated as commodities," and (2) the central importance of economic conditions to
women's equality: "The current economy is formed by gendered allocations of work that
subordinate women. Obtaining equality for women depends upon their gaining recognition as commercial actors." Id. at 631-33.
13. For a history of women's efforts to attain full economic citizenship rights, see ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQuITY: WOMEN, MEN AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC

(2001).
See KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD 166-67 (1997).
15. See Shelley Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist Perspective, 10
Am. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 861, 861 (1995).
16. See AFL-CIO, Worker's Rights are Women's Rights, available at http://www.afl-cio.org/
women/workersrights.htm; see also International Labor Organization statistics, availableat
CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA

14.
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World women work at the bottom end, often in the informal economy, of internationalized production systems, such as the garment or
semiconductor industries.' 7 In the United States as well, women, and
especially women of color, are concentrated in the lowest paying and
least stable sectors of the workforce.' Women workers in the United
States earn seventy-six cents for every dollar earned by a man.' 9 The
proportion of women in the American working poor is higher than
that of men.2" Women are uniquely vulnerable to workplace discrimination, sexual harassment, and abuse, and women of color face the
21
compounded problems of race and sex discrimination.
Moreover, women have historically been excluded from mainstream worker organizations and they continue to face extraordinary
obstacles when they seek to gain a collective voice on the job.22 They
predominate in the historically non-unionized service and informal
sector, and low-wage women workers who are often sole caregivers,
face greater risks and losses when employers threaten retaliation for
attempts at organization. Any effort to examine or advocate for gender equality, therefore, must entail an understanding of women as
laborers.
A look at NAALC and gender is important, not only because of
the need for greater focus on women's economic position, but because in our current system, women's inequality must be seen through
a global lens. In recent years, scholars of domestic poverty law and
welfare, such as Lucy Williams, Lucie White, and Frances Ansley, have
argued that it is impossible to understand current changes in the nahttp://www.ilo.org/pul)lic/english/index.htm (on file with the author) (last visited June
17, 2002).
17. See Moooy, supra note 14, at 78-79, 166.
18. See id. at 167. Not only are women concentrated in low-paying, stereotypically female jobs but some companies actively recruit women for stereotypically male jobs as a way
to reduce labor costs. For example, when the meatpacking industry reorganized in the
1980s, companies actively sought women, as well as male immigrants, even though this
work did not conform to the stereotype of women's work.
19. See Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://
www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). This is up from 63% in 1979,
but is still far below equal pay for equal work. Id.
20. See Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://bls.gov/
cps/cpsaat41.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
21. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demnarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (arguing that Black women experience discrimination in employment differently from Black men or white women and that due to the intersection of race
and gender the experience of discrimination is compounded).
22. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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tion's welfare policy or low-wage labor market without viewing those
developments in the context of current global economic and political
23
change. '
Some of the worst features of the global economy look hauntingly
familiar to critics of U.S. welfare policy. ...In country after country

around the globe, whether rich or poor, highly industrialized or
underdeveloped, authoritarian or liberal democratic, governments
are adopting similar measures, large corporations are 24pushing similar agendas, and similar social effects are being felt.
Just as women's equality in America cannot be viewed as a domestic problem or non-economic problem, neither can free trade and labor rights be viewed as gender-less issues. Feminist scholars have
explored globalization's gendered nature and have examined the connection between global economic restructuring, massive migration by
women in third world countries, and the resulting feminization of
wage labor.2 5 Studies commissioned by the United Nations have explored the connection between trade, economic development, and
gender, concluding that "gender inequality holds back the growth of
individuals, the development of countries and the evolution of
'26
societies.
However, much of the literature examining NAFTA's labor side
agreement fails to consider gender at all. 27 The academic writing that
23. See Frances Lee Ansley, Afterward: What's the Globe Got to Do With It?, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST WELFARE ERA 207, 210 Uoel F. Handler & Lucie White
eds., 1999); see also Williams, supra note 2, at 1245.
24. Anlsey, supra note 23, at 210.
25. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, The Incorporation of Third World Women into Wage Labor, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS supra note 7, at 111; WOMEN WORKERS AND GLOBAL
RESTRUCTURING (Kathryn Ward ed., 1990); WOMEN WORKING THE NAFTA FooD CHAIN: WOMEN FOOD AND GLOBALIZATION (Deborah Barndt ed., 1999) (discussing the role of women
in the increasingly globalized agrifood system but without discussion of the NAALC); see
also MOODY, supra note 14, at 166-68.
26. THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION, LIVES TOGETHER, WORLDS APART: MEN AND WOMEN IN A TIME OF CHANGE, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND 1

(2000).

27. See, e.g., Stephen F. Diamond, Labor Rights in the Global Economy: A Case Study of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR TRADE, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 199, 220 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996); Clyde Summers,
NAFFA's Labor Side Agreement and InternationalLabor Standards, 3J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 173 (1999); Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor CooperationAgreement Among Mexico, Canada
and the United States: Its Negotiation and Prospects, 3 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 121 (1995); Maria Teresa
Guerra & Anna L. Torriente, The NAALC and the Labor Laws of Mexico and the United States,
14 ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 503 (1997); Lance Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New
InternationalLabor Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 159 (1995); Lance Compa,
Going Multilateral:The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric LaborRights Policy Under GSP and NAFTA,
10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1995); Barry LaSala, NAFT"A and Worker Rights: An Analysis of the
Labor Side Accord After Five Years of Operation and Suggested Improvements, 16 LAB. L. 319
(2001); Paul Lall, Note, Immigrant Farmworkers and the North American Agreement on Labor
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does address NAALC and gender focuses almost exclusively on the
plight of Mexican women, living in Mexico. 28 Mexican women in the
maquiladoras labor under abhorrent conditions, facing pervasive sex
discrimination and enjoying virtually no right to organize. t 1
Yet NAALC is relevant not only to women in Mexico but also to
women living in the United States. Women in America, like those in
Mexico, are economic actors who have been affected by globalization.
Moreover, they have experienced globalization in different ways and,
at times, more adversely than their male counterparts. For example,
globalization has had a significant impact on women who work in
American manufacturing industries. When manufacturing companies

move production offshore, women, as well as men, lose employment.
In fact, the industries most likely to move are those heavily dependent
on women, particularly immigrant women and women of color.1 1

Globalization has also resulted in a reduction of labor's bargaining
power, particularly in female-dominated industries such as textiles.
Employers are more likely than ever to issue credible threats that they
will withdraw their capital and move south if they cannot induce sufficient concessions from their employees or municipalities. For example, when workers in the United States try to form unions, at least half
Cooperation, 31 CoLuN. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 597 (2000); Lance Compa, Naflas Labor Side
Accord: A Three Year Accounting, 3 NAF'TA L. & Bus. REv. AM. 6 (1997); Chantell Taylor,
NAtIfA, GA7'1, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers'
Rights, 28 DENv..J. INF'L L. & PoL'v 401 (2001); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon
and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 25 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 93
(1999).
28. SeeJoshua Briones, Paying the Price for NAFIA: NAFIA s Effect on Women and Children
Laborers in Mexico, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1999); John Isa, Testing the NAALC Dispute
Resolution System: A Case Study, 6 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 615 (1998); Catherine
Barbieri, Comment, Women Workers in Transition: The PotentialImpact of the NAFJ'A LaborSide
Agreements on Women Workers in Argentina and Chile, 17 COM. LAB. L.J. 526 (1996); Laurie
Bremer, Pregnancy Discrimination in Mexico's MaquiladoraSystem: Mexico's Violation of Its Obligations Under the NAFIA and the NAALC, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 567 (1999). But see
Brian S. Johnson, Note, Ensuning Equality: Pursuing Implementation of the Equal Pay Principle
Via the Institutions of the European Union, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,
and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 849 (1998).
29. See Human Rights Watch, Women's Rights Project, No Guarantees: Sex Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPOR-r, Aug. 1996; Human
Rights Watch, Women's Rights Project, A job or Your Rights: Continued Sex Discriminationin
Mexico's MaquiladoraSector; Dec. 1998, at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/women2/ (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003) (documenting systemic pregnancy discrimination in the Mexican maquiladora sector).
30. See NAFT'A Called GreaterJob Risk for Women, CHi TRIB., Sept. 29, 1993, at H7
("Though women make up only 33%of all manufacturing jobs in the United States, they
dominate in those industries most likely to move plants-and jobs-to Mexico ....").
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of the employers threaten to close their plants. 3 1 For women, and par-

ticularly low-wage women workers who have considerable family obligations but little in the way of family support, such threats can have
particular saliency.
Globalization also affects women who work in the relatively immobile service sector in the United States. Newly arrived female immigrants, pushed from their homes due to crisis conditions linked to
economic restructuring, fill more and more of the low-wage service
jobs in the United States. 32 Much of this migrant labor is illegal. As a
result, laws setting minimum wage, health and safety, and collective
bargaining rights remain on the books, but whole sectors of the economy operate with workers unlikely to enforce their rights, for fear of
INS retaliation. 33 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB-34 further undermines the workplace
rights of undocumented immigrants. In a five-to-four majority the
Court held that the NLRB lacks the authority to award back pay to
undocumented non-citizens who have been illegally terminated by
their employers in retaliation for union activity.3 5 Again, for women,
such fear of retaliation and awareness of the absence of legal recourse
have added impact: sexual harassment laws, sex discrimination laws,
and even rape laws are rarely enforced among undocumented women
36
workers.
Legal immigrants in some sectors also have limited workplace
rights. Agricultural migrants, for example, work without coverage
under much American domestic labor law, including the National La37
bor Relations Act and parts of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Moreo-

31. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission, Uneasy Terrain,
The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages and Union Organizing,Sept. 6, 2000, tbl. 3, at
http://www.ustdrc.gov/research/bronfenbrenner.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
32. See Ansley, supra note 23, at 212.
33. See id.
34. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
35. See id. Immigrant advocates argue that undocumented workers will now be more
afraid to report discrimination, safety violations, or abuses by employers. Even those who
support restriction on immigration criticized the decision, arguing that making undocumented workers ineligible for back-pay creates an incentive for employers to hire such
workers. See Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Supreme Court Denies Back Pay to Fired
Undocumented Immigrants, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 22, 2002, at 3. It is unclear whether the Supreme
Court's rationale will apply to other workplace laws, such as Title VII and workers
compensation.

36.

See Melanie Ryan, Swept Under the Carpet: Lack of Legal Protectionsfor Household Work-

ers, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 159, 169 (1999).

37. See Michael Holley, Disadvantagedby Design: How the Law Inhibits Guest Agricultural
Workers from Enfarcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575 (2001).

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO IAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

ver, legal regulation of migration and immigration tends to reproduce
and exacerbate the social and cultural inequalities that disempower
female migrants in the first place."8 Female domestic migrants, even
with proper documentation, are left vulnerable to violations of physical security and sexual abuse" '
Thus, an examination of NAALC as a potential source of transnational labor rights is important not only because globalization has an
impact on women, but also because domestic law, has historically
failed to address adequately the issues faced by women workers. 4 The
development of transnational norms, the erosion of the state as the
site for labor regulation, and the creation of transnational "human
rights" could therefore be promising developments for feminists and
labor rights supporters.4a Yet, international human rights agreements
do not necessarily result in better human rights practices.42 In the
context of globalization, it becomes critically important to examine
and evaluate NAALC and the other transnational legal norms, and to
question the extent to which they enforce and expand the rights of
women laborers.
III.

Debating and Negotiating NAFrA: Where Were the
Women?

In February 1991, then-President George Bush announced that
Mexico, Canada, and the United States would begin trilateral negotiations on a trade agreement. 4 " The subsequent process of negotiating
38. See Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 8, at 48.
39. For a discussion of the failure of states to protect women in the "maid trade" from
sexual exploitation, see id. at 69, 76.
40. For a history of legal regulation of women at work in the United States, see KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 13, and ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK (1982).
41. In recent years, activists and NGOs have worked to create rights for women at a
transnational level by redefining the meaning of human rights to encompass the particular
experiences of women. SeeJane Connors, NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United
Nations, in TilE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN TIHE UN SYSTEM 147, 147 (Peter Willitts ed., 1996). As a result of the work of
such NGOs, "large steps have been taken towards the full acknowledgement of women's
rights as human rights, while the human rights agenda of the United Nations has expanded to include areas such as violence against women, both in the public and private
sphere, and other gender specific abuses." Id. at 147.
42. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935 (2002) (presenting quantitative analysis showing that ratification of international
human rights treaties is not associated with better human rights practices).
43. NAFTA was actually an extension of the Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"), which
went into effect on January 1, 1989. U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 100-449
(1988). See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 2, 110-16. While some describe NAFTA as the first
time in the modern trading era that two wealthy industrialized countries negotiated a free
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and passing NAFTA by a majority of the United States House and Senate was highly contested, both in terms of its policy implications, and
(at least among legal academics) in terms of its constitutionality. 44 In
response to President Bush's announcement, community activists, environmentalists, and development, consumer, and human rights advocates from all three countries began to form coalitions in an effort to
shape the trade discussions. 45 Notably absent from the ensuing public
debate around NAFTA in the United States were leading women's
rights groups, as well as an articulated gender analysis from congres46
sional leaders, unions, and citizen groups.
A.

The Public Debate

In order to pursue negotiations of a free trade agreement with
Mexico and Canada, President Bush first sought congressional prior
approval, known as fast-track authority. 4 7 Many grassroots and advotrade agreement, see, e.g., AARONSON supra note 3, at 117; others argue that NAFTA should
be understood as part of a long process of integrating Mexico into the United States dominated regional economy, not as a break from the past. See Diamond, supra note 27, at
208-11.
44. The constitutional debate over NAFTA centered on whether the agreement required approval by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, in accordance with the treaty clause,
Article 1I, Section 2, rather than by a majority of both houses. See generally Bruce Ackerman
& David Golove, Is NAFIA Constitutional?108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (arguing that political events of the 1940s altered the proper understanding of the Constitution so that the
Treaty Clause became optional and concluding that NAFTA, passed by a majority of both
houses, is in fact constitutional); but cf Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: t6flections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV 1221,
1225-1302 (1995) (challenging Ackerman and Golove and arguing that arguments regarding the Constitution's instructions for treaty-making as merely optional are flawed because
they are not genuinely constrained by the Constitution's text or structure). However, no
one discussed this problem publicly during the NAFTA debates. See Ackerman & Golove,
supra, at 802; Tribe, supra, at 1227.
45. While an examination of the role of women's groups and gender issues in the
public debate in all three countries would be more useful, for the purpose of this paper I
will look primarily at the public debate in the United States.
46. In addition, histories of the passage of NAFTA in the United States make little
mention of women's issues or gender, and they fail to discuss the relevance or impact of
women's absence. For example, in Susan Aaronson's extensive history of the public debates around NAFTA there is no examination of the role of women's groups or gender
issues in the American NAFTA debates-nor is there any discussion of why such issues
were not raised. See AARONSON, supra note 3; see also MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W.
TOMUN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: How THE DEAL WAS DONE (2000) (detailing the NAFTA
negotiations with no examination of gender issues or the absence of organized women's
groups in the negotiations); MARYSE ROBERT, NEGOTIATING NAFTA: EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME IN CULTURE, TEXTILES, AUTOS, AND PHARMACEUTICALS, 22-47 (2000) (describing the
political process around the passage of NAFTA without mention of women).
47. See Frances Lee Ansley, North American Free Trade Agreement: The Public Debate, 22
GA.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 329, 343 (1992). President Bush's February 5, 1991 announcement
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cacy organizations opposed fast-track, fearing that it would allow the
administration to negotiate corporate-friendly agreements, free from
public scrutiny and involvement. Groups such as the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth, and the United Auto Workers ("UAW"), demanded that Congress hold separate hearings on NAFTA's potential
48
impact on labor, food safety, and human rights.
Democratic congressional leaders, and some conservative protectionist legislators, in turn insisted that President Bush provide detailed
predictions of NAFTA's effects on the environment, jobs, and worker
rights. In response to pressure from congressional Democrats and
civic organizations, in May of 1991, the administration promised that
it would deal with the labor and environmental issues in a "parallel"
process. 4 -1 Subsequently, despite continued opposition from civic
groups, neither the House nor the Senate had enough votes to win a
vote of disapproval, and fast-track authority was extended to the
President.

5

1'

As NAFTA negotiations got underway, opposition escalated and
the issue became central to the presidential election and the campaign of independent candidate H. Ross Perot,5 1 yet still no major
women's groups appeared as participants in the public debate.5 2 Two
key coalitions formed. One concentrated on working with Mexican
and Canadian groups and sought to strengthen and improve the labor
and environmental protections in the agreement. The other focused
nationally and was concerned about the anti-democratic nature of the
negotiations and American job loss; this group opposed NAFTA altoof his intention to begin trilateral negotiates "triggered a 60 day limitations period during
which either house of Congress could have disapproved the application of 'fast-track' procedure to legislation implementing NAFTA." Id.
48. See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 118.
49. President George Bush, Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, May 1, 1991, in
AARONSON, supra note 3, at 118. Selected portions of the memorandum to Congress are
reprinted in 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 718 (May 8, 1991).
50. See Ansley, supra note 23, at 343-44.
51. In 1992 billionaire Perot ran for President as an independent on an anti-NAFTA
platform, building a grassroots political movement. Perot became identified as the major
anti-NAFTA spokesperson, even as he alienated many civic and environmental groups with
his protectionist stances. See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 134-36.
52. At hearings conducted by the Trade Staff Policy Committee from August to September of 1991, speakers ranged from the Chief Executive Officers of the Gap and Bank of
America to representatives from the Environmental Defense Fund, Public Citizen, the
Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and the United Auto Workers, but did not include
any major women's groups. See Ansley, supra note 23, at 347 for selected testimony from
the 1991 hearings.
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gether.53 Both coalitions included environmental advocacy and grassroots groups, labor unions, human rights groups, consumer rights
groups, and civil rights groups-but no national women's groups. Vocal proponents of NAFTA and free trade similarly did not include women's rights organizations. Bush's Advisory Committee on Trade
Policy and Negotiations, for example, was dominated by multi-na54
tional executives.
American women's lack of effective mobilization on the issue of
55
NAFTA stands in sharp contrast to the activism of Canadian women,
as Canadian women's groups mobilized and articulated opposition to
the agreement in the language of women's rights. 5 6 Canadian wo53. Of the two coalitions, the Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor and the
Environment ("MODTLE") was more policy oriented and internationalist. It included the
Institute for Policy Studies, International Labor Rights Fund, Development GAP, Community Nutrition Institute, Center of Concern (affiliated with the Jesuits), National Consumers League, Presbyterian Church USA, Maryknoll Fathers, Institute for Agriculture and
Trade Policy, American Agricultural Movement, and National Lawyers Guild. A second
coalition, Citizens Trade Campaign ("CTC"), was more action oriented, focused on the
undemocratic nature of trade agreements, and more nationalist. It included Friends of the
Earth, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, National
Farmers Union, National Consumers League, United Auto Workers, Rainbow Coalition,
and Americans for Democratic Action. See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 125-27.
54. See id. at 119-20.
55. There is less information available about the role of women in the Mexican debate. There, NAFTA had strong support from the elites and according to polling data,
most Mexicans had little understanding of the trade agreement. See id. at 133. However,
news accounts suggest that there were some grassroots organizing efforts among women
workers demanding greater labor rights as part of the agreement. See, e.g., Michelle Ruess,
Mexican Women Seek Workers'Rights, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 5, 1993, at 8A [hereinafter Workers'Rights]; Michelle Ruess, Many Mexican Women Stuck in Factory Grind, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, May 9, 1993, at 20A [hereinafter Factory Grind] (describing organizing in
Mexico by grassroots groups such as Mujer a Mujer and the Border Women's Worker
Committee).
56. An adequate exploration of why the two feminist movements played such different roles in the trade debates is beyond the scope of this paper. Canadian feminist
Marjorie Griffin Cohen points to the economic dislocation experienced by many Canadians in the 1980s to explain the increasingly economic focus of the Canadian feminist
movement. She also explains that during this period leftists and trade unionists took on
more leadership positions within the feminist movement. Finally, she suggests that because
the Liberal Party had lost power prior to the NAFTA debates, feminists were more willing
to take positions sharply critical of the government. See Marjorie Griffin Cohen, The Women's Movement and the CanadianEconomy, in CHALLENGIN(G TIMES: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 214, 220 (Constance Backhouse & David Flaherty eds.,
1992) [hereinafter CHALLENGING TIMES]. In addition to the Canadian economic and political context in the early 1980s, another possible explanation for the difference lies in the
movements' structures and funding sources. Canadian women's groups have tended to be
structured as loose coalitions of local grassroots organizations, rather than as more centralized, national advocacy groups, and have therefore had greater participation from working-class women. This local focus grows out of the Canadian federalist structure of

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

men's groups first became involved in efforts to reshape trade agreements in the 1980s, in part because of the deep economic recession in
Canada.5 7 During this period, the National Action Committee on the
Status of Women ("NAC"), a coalition of women's groups whose leadership included prominent trade unionists, actively opposed the Free
Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada, the precursor to NAFTA. 5 1 NAC leaders explained that they saw women's issues
as economic: "[U]litimately all of the issues we were fighting for are
related to the way society is constructed .... [We] could not ignore
the larger agenda of economic restructuring and the government's
design for Canada, since they would affect virtually every issue on wo51
men's agenda for action."
Canadian women's groups were also members of a broad coalition called the Council of Canadians which saw its goal as building
public awareness about ways to preserve Canada's social compact in
the context of globalization. 61 The Council focused on how trade
would hurt society's most vulnerable citizens, arguing that it would
cause reductions in Canada's social welfare system, including childcare services,"' and pointed out the gendered impact that free trade
would have: "Women work in the very manufacturing and service industries that are most vulnerable in a free trade market. '62 Canadian
women continued to voice concerns about the terms of globalization
during the NAFTA debates, with the National Action Committee on
government under which political decision-making is rarely exercised at a national or
cross-provincial level. In addition, Canadian groups have had less need to fundraise from
major donors, because the largest coalition of women's groups in Canada historically has
received considerable government funding. The focus of Canadian groups, therefore, has
been less shaped by the elite. See Naomi Black, Ripples in the Second Wave: Comparing the
Contemporary Womens Movement in Canada and the United States, in CirIALLENOINc. TIMES,
supra, at 220. See generally id. (presenting a range of essays on the differences between the
Canadian and American feminist movements). For a history of legal feminist groups in
Canada more similar to contemporary American groups, see SIHERENE RAZACK, CANADIAN
FEMINISM AND TIE LAw:

surr

THE

WOMEN'S LEGAL EDUCATION ANI) AcrI'ION FUND AND THE PUR-

OF EQUALITY (1991).

57.
58.

See Cohen, supra note 56, at 220.
See Kate Lebow, Women Big Losers if Pact Passes, LAS VEGAS REV.J., Nov. 14, 1993, at

59.

Cohen, suna note 56, at 217-18, 220.

IF.
60. See Council of Canadians' website, at http://www.canadians.org (last visited Apr.,
1I, 2003). The Council of Canadians remains influential today and works closely with Public Citizen. See alo AARONSON, supra note 3, at 113.
61. See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 113.
62. Majorie Cohen, Women and Free Trade, in TI-IE FREE TRADE PAPERS 144-45
(Duncan Cameron ed., 1986).
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the Status of Women remaining in the forefront of the ultimately un63
successful movement to stop NAFTA.
The comparative lack of involvement by United States women's
groups must be viewed in the context of the historically uneasy relationship between mainstream American feminist groups, dominated
by middle-class and elite women, on the one hand, and organized labor and working-class women on the other. 64 While intermittently allied with women unionists on issues such as pay equity and
reproductive rights, liberal feminist groups like the National Organization for Women ("NOW"), the National Abortion Rights Action
League, and the League of Women Voters have not generally had
working-class women or women of color as their base or focus. Contemporary American women's groups have tended to concentrate
more on advocacy, litigation, fundraising, and lobbying, rather than
on building grassroots support among the broad range of American
women. Ideologically shaped by liberalism, their focus has primarily
been on individual choice, personal autonomy, and equality, rather
than on a structural critique of the economy. 65 Moreover, with women
historically marginalized in the American labor movement, the shared
interests between liberal feminist groups and unions have not been
66
naturally apparent.
A gender focus was missing from the American debates not only
because women's groups failed to understand trade and labor as women's issues, but also because of the role of organized labor. Of the
groups opposing NAFTA in the United States, the labor movement

63. See Lebow, supra note 57, at IF. Unlike their American counterparts, Canadian
NGOs were united in their opposition to the negotiated side agreements, which they
deemed inadequate. Despite the broad coalition, when Conservatives won a majority of
seats in Parliament, Canada passed NAFTA. See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 132.
64. For example, women unionists battled with upper-class feminist activists regarding
the ERA from the 1920s to the mid 1960s, attacking the ERA's language of liberal individualism. Many women unionists saw the feminist's goal of elimination of protective legislation
as threatening working-class women's hard-won gains. See DENNIS A. DESLIPPE, RIGHTS NOT
ROSES: UNIONS AND THE RISE OF WORKING-CLAss FEMINISM, 1945-1980, 5, 138-39 (2000). In
the post-World War II period, however, women unionists embraced and fought for gender
equality at work, rejected protectionist legislation, and by the 1970s, endorsed the ERA and
built a new but uneasy alliance with middle-class and elite feminists. In the late 1970s,
divisions between liberal groups and women unionists grew again, with debates over seniority systems, which many union members supported. See generally id.
65. See M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Class, Ideology and the Reproductive Dilemma, in
CHALLENGING TIMES, supra note 56, at 252, 263
66. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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was arguably the "most powerful and most vocal, ' ' , 7 and therefore had
a unique ability to shape the debates. Most of organized labor's efforts
around NAFTA were led by the labor movement's male-dominated
manufacturing unions, and failed to involve or consider the women
workers in the Mexican maquiladoras and American sweatshops, or
the increasing pool of mostly female, immigrant workers in low-wage
service work, except insofar as they posed a threat to American jobs.
Rather than focusing on the right to organize and actively working to
involve women workers, American unions engaged in the NAFTA debate focused primarily on how NAFTA would reduce men's existing
manufacturing jobs."8
The labor movement's protectionist focus in the NAFTA debates
can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the unions leading
the opposition to NAFTA were the largely male manufacturing unions, which had historically excluded women from their ranks. Unions
representing workers in industries that were more heavily female,
such as education, also opposed NAFTA, yet they felt they had less of a
stake in the outcome of the debate, and were not willing to expend as
much political capital"'1 According to a 1993 Washington Post article:
67. Guy Gugliotta, North American Free Trade Pact Could Shorten Clinton Honeymoon,
WNASii. Posr, Nov. 14, 1992, at A14; Thomas B. Edsall, Are Labor Tactics on NAFJ'A Real
Threats or 'Tough Love'?, WASH. Posr, Nov. 16, 1993, at A24 ("Organized Labor is the single
most important source of cash for House and Senate Democratic candidates.").
68. News accounts of statements made by the AFL-CIO demonstrate the protectionist
focus of organized labor's opposition to NAFTA. E.g., Stuart Auerbach, Mexico Comes Callingfir Free Trade, WAsh. PosTrJune 10, 1990, at HI ("A free-trade agreement is opposed by
politically powerful segments of the American economy, including organized labor, which
fears a hemorrhage of United States jobs to low-wage factories south of the border and
Isunset,' or declining, industries such as textile and clothing manufacturers. United States
labor opposition would intensify if low-wage Mexican labor could flood legally into this
country."); Clyde H. Farnsworth, Revival of Trade Talks Stirs Political Fight in the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at DI ("Fearingjob losses and pay cuts from a trade pact with Mexico,
where workers make roughly about 5 percent of what workers earn in the United States,
the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has made blocking a Mexican agreement its No. 1 legislative priority. In
recent congressional testimony, Thomas R. Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the labor federation, called the prospective accord "an economic and social disaster" for American
workers and argued that use of fast-track "seriously limits both public and congressional
involvement in discussions with Mexico and dilutes the lawmaking authority of Congress."); Peter T. Kilborn, Hailing Health Plan but Denouncing Trade Pact, N.Y. TiMES, Sept.
16, 1993, at A21 (describing tnion leader's concerns that NAFTA would lead to more plant
closures); see also AARONSON, supra note 3, at 137 ("[U]nion officials were united in opposing NAFTA and believing it would yield lower standards, lower wages, and fewer jobs.").
69. See Peter T. Kilborn, Unions Girdfor War over Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at
A14 (reporting from the AFL-CIO convention that not a single union in attendance backs
NAFTA, but that some, "like the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, and the American Federation of Teachers are less alarmed than others," and that
at least one maior union, the American Federation of Government Employees, questions
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Organized labor is putting up an exceptionally unified front in its
battle to defeat NAFTA, but the solid opposition of unions allied
with the AFL-CIO masks a wide range of intensity. It is primarily
private sector unions, especially manufacturing unions, that see
7
NAFTA as crushing U.S. jobs and decimating their membership. 0
Just as the failure of women's groups to mobilize around NAFTA
must be seen in its historical context, so too should the absence of
gender from the mainstream labor agenda. Organized labor has had a
contradictory history with respect to women and feminism in the
United States. While unions have served as a source of power to advance the interests of working-class women and as a space in which
women can organize collectively, women have also suffered acute ex7
clusion as male-dominated unions sought to protect their standards. '
Although national women's groups failed to mobilize, and although organized labor was primarily focused on protecting male
manufacturing jobs, some labor activists did join with some women's
rights activists to raise the issue of gender. In October of 1993, for
example, participants at a meeting sponsored by the Women for Economic Justice in Chicago, a newly founded coalition of local women's
groups aimed at addressing issues of trade and gender, pointed out
that NAFTA's proponents had "glossed over" the disparate impact
NAFTA would have on women workers. 72 In addition, feminist
magazines such as Ms. ran an occasional story about the impact of
NAFTA on women, focusing primarily on the exploitation of Mexican
the wisdom of working to defeat members of Congress who support the trade agreement).
Similarly, the manufacturing unions leading the opposition to NAFTA were largely white;
critics have pointed to the racist undercurrent in the American labor movement's opposition to NAF'A. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 220.
70. Edsall, supra note 66, at A24.
In the 18 years from 1975 to 1993, when the United States marketplace began to
open to competition from Asia, Europe, and Latin America, membership in the
steelworkers union has collapsed from 1.1 million to 421,000, the Teamsters from
2.4 million to 1.3 million, the machinists from 780,000 to 474,000 and the garment workers from 363,000 to 133,000.
71. For a history of women's activity in, and exclusion from, the American labor
movement, see DESLIPPE, supra note 63, at 5; Philip Foner, Women and the American Labor
Movement: A Historical Perspecitive, in WORKING WOMEN, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 154
(Karen Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987); NANCY F. CABIN, FEMINISM IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT: WOMEN AND THE UNITED Au-To WORKERS, 1935-1975 (1990); WOMEN, WORK AND
PROTEST (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985).

72. See Nancy Ryan, NAFI'A Called GreaterJobRisk for Women, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1993
(Business), at I (describing a meeting of women's rights and labor rights' activists and a
study showing that industries in which women predominate would likely face the greatest
job loss under NAFTA). Women for Economic Justice was founded in 1993 by a former
laboir organizer with the aim of promoting issues of gender in the trade debate, and appears to have disbanded in 1996.
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women. 73 A few journalists in local and regional papers detailed the
exploitation of women workers in the maquiladoras and referred to
women's grassroots organizing efforts in all three countries in opposi74
tion to NAFTA.
As the debate drew to a close, the gender issue came further to
the forefront. In November of 1993, an international coordinator for
Labor Notes, a United States labor rights organization, was quoted as
saying, "People are just now beginning to see the tremendous impact
NAFTA will have on women.... It's taken a while because negotia'75
tions were so secretive.
B.

Negotiating the Labor Side Agreement

NAFTA was signed by the heads of state of Mexico, Canada, and
the United States in 1992, as the Bush administration left office. However, an environmental or labor agreement had yet to be negotiated.

While Bush had alluded to support for labor and environmental protections, the real genesis of the side agreements was in the 1992 presidential campaign of Bill Clinton. 76 Clinton, in an effort to balance the
social concerns of his Democratic base with the market-opening policies of his economic advisers and corporate funders, pledged continued support for free trade and NAFTA but promised to negotiate side
77
agreements that would protect labor and environmental standards.
After winning the election, the Clinton administration began negotiations on the side agreements. However, the administration was
73. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kadetsky, The Human Cost of Free Trade: FemaleFactory Workers in
Mexico, Ms., Jan/Feb, 1994, at 10.
74. See Michelle M. Schoennng, Groups Say Female Workers Fare Worse With NAFTA, AusTIN Am.STATESMAN, Nov. 14, 1993, at F8; Lebow, supra note 57, at IF, also printed in THE
RECORo (Northern NewJersey), Nov. 12, 1993, at D7; Workers'Rights, supra note 54, at 8A;
Factory Grind, supra note 54, at 20A (describing organizing in Mexico by grassroots groups
such as Mujer a Mujer and the Border Women's Worker Committee).
75. Mary McGuinn, International Coordinator for Labor Notes, quoted in Michelle M.
Schoenung, Groups Say Female Workers Fare Worse With NAFTA, AusTIN AM. STATESMAN, Nov.
14, 1993, at F8. Labor Notes is a non-profit organization formed in 1979 that aims to revitalize and democratize the American labor movement. It runs a monthly newspaper, as
well as conferences and workshops, and often is critical of union leadership. See Labor
Notes website at http://www.labornotes.org (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
76. See Compa, The First
NAFI'A Labor Cases, supra note 27, at 162; Hersztein, supra
note 27. For a detailed analysis of development and negotiation of the labor and environmental side agreements see CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 46, at 179-207.
77. See Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, Address
at Raleigh, North Carolina (Oct. 4, 1992); see also CAMERON & TOMLIN, supranote 46, at 180
(describing the presidential debates and Clinton's promises regarding NAFTA and the side
agreements).
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divided on what form such agreements should take, with some advisers taking a pro-business position and others advocating for strong
labor and environmental protections. 78 Though women's groups had
been major supporters of Clinton and could possibly have wielded influence over the shaping of the labor agreement, they remained off
the political radar screen throughout the negotiation of the side
agreements.
The notion of a labor side agreement was met with stiff resistance
from the Mexican government. On the opening day of negotiations,
held on March 17, 1993, Mexico made clear that it wanted respect for
sovereignty, no renegotiation of NAFTA, and no trade sanctions for
labor or environmental violations. 79 The Mexican negotiators flatly rejected the idea of creating a supra-national commission or tribunal
that might have the power to supercede Mexico's domestic laws. They
pointed to the opposition of the government-affiliated trade union, as
well as business groups, to any agreement that would substantially
change the existing system of industrial labor relations. While business groups feared that new standards would undermine the competitive advantage Mexico offered, the state-supported trade union feared
that a strong labor side agreement might threaten its monopolistic
control over organized labor s°
After much internal discussion, the Americans initially proposed
an accord that was broad in scope, covering union rights as well as
technical labor violations, such as health and safety laws and minimum wage provisions. The American proposal created a higher international standard of labor rights that would apply to all three
countries, and contained enforcement provisions and sanctions. Canada, however, which was represented by a newly elected conservative
government, argued for an agreement with no trade sanctions and
with standards based on each country's own domestic law."' Meanwhile, well-organized business lobbies in all three countries vigorously
campaigned against language that would create enforceable labor
rights.8 2 Still no women's groups were involved. By midsummer, the
United States backed off many of its demands, and a compromise was
78. A draft memo of three possible proposals for the side agreements reflected the
divisions within the Clinton administration. See CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 46, at 184.
79. See id. at 186, 188.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 193-95.
82. See Matthew Griffin, Note, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A
FlawedAttempt at PromotingContinental Labor Standards,21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 113,
115-16 (1997).
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reached that set out joint labor principles but only required the gov83
ernments to enforce their own domestic laws.
C.

The Congressional Debate

The NAALC was completed in August of 1993; Clinton endorsed
the package and then sent NAFTA to Congress for ratification. The
ensuing congressional debate did occasionally explore how NAFTA
itself might impact women. Such discussions were at most tangential-most debate revolved around whether NAFTA would result in
net job losses or gains-yet the role gender played in the deliberation
is nevertheless revealing: discussion focused on women's responsibilities as mothers, and for the most part, depicted women as victims,
rather than as actors.
On the floor of Congress, women's issues were raised most frequently by opponents of the agreement.8 4 Senator Riegle from Michigan, for example, challenged Senator Barbara Boxer, one of six
women in the Senate at the time, 85 arguing that her support of
NAFTA threatened women in particular:
I say to the Senator from California, I visited a plant recently in a
town just outside of Detroit, principally a work force of women.
They were making radiator hoses. That company just closed and
they moved the jobs down to Mexico. They had 2 weeks to go
before the plant was actually going to close. I went out there to talk
to the women who were working there. They were told, by the way,
by the person managing the company, that if they came out to talk
to me about it, as a U.S. Senator on the sidewalk, they ran the risk
of not being able to stay on and finish the last 2 weeks of work
before the plant did close. That was the intimidation to keep them
from talking to me. Many did come out and talk to me, despite that
fact. Most of them are single, heads of households. They are just
scraping by, so they may have 2 or 3 children at home, trying to
hold their lives together, and they have no alternative work. Now
that plant is closed. There is no other work for them to do. They
cannot get an income. I mean, the notion that they can provide
83. See infra Part IV for a detailed analysis of the NAALC's principles, structure, and
procedures.
84. Congressional debate about how NAFFA and NAALC might impact people of
color was similarly rare. Senator Carol Moseley Braun argued that NAFTA would have a
disparate impact on African American workers. See 139 CONG. REC. S16057-01 (daily ed.
Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Braun), WL 139 CONG. REC. 478650.
85. See United States Senate, Senate Statistics, Women in the Senate, at http://
www.senate.gov/artinhistory/history/common/briefing/womensenators.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2003).
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properly for their children or have health care, it is out of the
question.

s6

The Senator continued, drawing on traditional notions of women's roles as caregivers, and emphasizing that NAFTA would undermine women's ability to mother.
I talked to some women in Owosso, MI the other day. Their plant
closed about 3 years ago. Their stories would break your heart. We
sat around a coffee table in a restaurant and talked for a while.
Here is what they told me. They told me that they had been so
poverty stricken since their plant closed and no replacement work,
that they buy virtually all their clothes at yard sales. They virtually
buy no new clothes, because they cannot afford even to go to lowcost outlets, like Kmart or Sears or Penney's to buy something because they just cannot afford it. They just do not have the income.
They have too many basic necessities that they have to pay for to
keep food on the table and the utility bills in the winter time, and
so forth. So they are buying clothing that has 8been
used two or
7
three times before, they are buying used shoes.
Unlike Barbara Boxer, some female legislators took a stand
against NAFTA and expressed concern about the agreement's effect
on women. Representative Marcy Kaptur, Congresswoman from Ohio,
attacked NAFTA for not being democratic, and the side letters for
being ineffective. She led a bipartisan delegation of eight women
members of Congress on a trip to the border region and the maquiladoras in Mexico in May of 1993.88 Kaptur organized the trip of all
female lawmakers to investigate how the proposed agreement would
affect women and families. 89 Notably, some proponents of NAFTA
also invoked women workers' rights to support their position. Senator
Bill Bradley of New Jersey, for example, pointed to Mexican law's
guarantee of twelve weeks paid maternity leave for Mexican women
workers as evidence that Mexican women were not suffering under
unfair labor conditions.9 1
While the plight of women workers was mentioned in Congress,
there was virtually no substantive discussion of how to make the labor
side agreement more effective at protecting the rights of workers generally or women workers in particular; there was no exploration of
86.
87.
88.
89.

139 CONG. REc. S16622-01 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
Id.
See 139 CONG. REc. H8843-04 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993).
See Michelle Ruess, NAFTA Not Mexicans' Top Concern, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,

May 2, 1993, at 4A.
90. See 139 CONG. REC. S16366-01 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993). Senator Sarbanes of Maryland responded, attacking Bradley's assertion as inaccurate. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

how NAALC would address issues of equal pay, employment discrimination, paid family leave, or women's organizing rights.
The lack of real debate regarding the terms of the labor side
agreement can be explained by several factors. For one, negotiations
happened behind closed doors and without congressional hearings.
Congress was asked to vote on NAFTA, knowing NAALC had been
negotiated, but because NAALC was an executive agreement, not integral to the trade agreement, the President did not seek legislative approval. 9 ' Thus, Congress had no effective opportunity to challenge
particular aspects of NAALC. Moreover, while there was some involvement of outside groups during its negotiation, there were no public
hearings, nor was there broad civic participation in the drafting of the
2
agreement.9
In addition, because civic groups, particularly unions, had focused primarily on trying to stop the flight of capital to Mexico-and
not on creating transnational labor rights norms-even labor's
staunch allies had no reason to focus on how NAALC would actually
work or how it would affect women. Just as neither women's groups
nor unions had framed gender issues as central to the debate, neither
did the legislators. Finally, with business so staunchly opposed to a
stronger labor side agreement, it was to the advantage of Congressional leaders considered allies of the labor and environmental movements but unwilling to alienate the business lobby, to point to the
labor side agreement as a victory, avoiding close scrutiny of its
provisions.
Ultimately, after only minimal discussion and public debate in
the United States about the gender implications of NAALC or
NAFTA, proponents of agreements prevailed. 3 Civic groups were divided on the final product. Some, including the AFL-CIO, the Sierra
Club, Public Citizen, and the International Labor Rights Fund, attacked the side agreements for being nothing more than rhetoric, useless at protecting workers' rights or the environment. Others, such as
91. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 215. The decision not to seek congressional approval for NAALC raises interesting constitutional questions. While Ackerman and Tribe,
supra note 44, do not discuss the labor side agreement in their debate over the constitutionality of NAFTA, NAALC, even more than NAFTA itself, exemplifies the presidential
move away from requesting approval of treaties in accordance with Article II, as the President did not even seek bicameral majority support for the side agreement.
92.

See CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 46.

93. According to AARONSON, supra note 3, while the administration waged a public
campaign articulating NAFTA's macroeconomic benefits to the US economy-emphasizing potential increases in number ofjobs-NAFTA ultimately passed because of favor trading and pork-barrel politics. See id. at 140.
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the Environmental Defense Fund and the National Wildlife Federation, thought that the side agreements would at least provide a tool to
improve Mexican regulations. 94 In the end, NAFTA passed the House
by a margin of thirty-four votes, 95 and the Senate by sixty-one to thirtyeight.96 On December 8, 1993, the President signed NAFTA and
97
NAALC into law.
IV.

NAALC: Interpreted Through a Gender Lens

The labor side agreement that emerged was thus the product of
competing political pressures, few of which were explicitly about gender or the rights of women workers. While Canadian and American
civic and labor groups mounted a vigorous campaign for the rights of
workers and the environment, well-organized business groups in all
three countries, the official Mexican union, and conservative forces
within the governments wielded significant influence over the negotiations. The final agreement thus expresses a commitment to labor
rights demanded by labor and civic groups, at the same time as it reflects the organized resistance to an agreement that would limit each
government's sovereign right to determine and implement domestic
labor law or that would too greatly impinge on corporate interests.
This tension becomes particularly clear when NAALC's efficacy is
analyzed with respect to gender. The agreement articulates broad labor principles critical to women workers and could serve an important
expressive function in campaigns for gender equality and labor rights,
yet it fails to provide enforceable rights for the women in the maquiladoras or in the American labor force.
A. NAALC's Labor Principles
The preamble of NAFTA commits the three states to "create new
employment opportunities, and improve working conditions and living standards in their respective territories; ...

and protect, enhance

94. Generally, NGOs that depended on large corporate grants for the bulk of their
funding ultimately supported NAFTA, while those with a grassroots base of individual donors continued to oppose it. See Compa, The First NAYJA Labor Cases, supra note 27, at n.26,
citingKeith Schneider, Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free-TradePact, N.Y. TiNIES,
Sept. 16, 1993, at Al.
95. See 139 CONG. REC. H10058 (daily ed. Nov 17, 1993).
96. See 139 CONG. REC. S16 712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993); North American Free
Trade Implementation Act § 101 (a), 19 U.S.C. § 3 3 11 (a) (Supp. 1993).
97.

See AARONSON, supra note 3, at 140.
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and enforce basic worker rights."' "8 Building off this preamble,
NAALC sets forth eleven guiding principles that the three signatories
commit themselves "to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law,"
all of which are relevant to women workers:
" freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
" the right to bargain collectively
* the right to strike
" prohibition of forced labor
* limitation of child labor
* minimum wage, hours of work and other labor standards
* elimination of employment discrimination
• equal pay for women and men

" occupational safety and health
• workers' compensation
* migrant worker protection."'"
The text of NAALC makes explicit that two of the enumerated
labor principles-non-discrimination and equal pay for equal workapply to women. Ioo NAALC's non-discrimination principle, for example, supports the elimination of discrimination "on grounds such as
race, religion, sex or other grounds.""" It also allows for affirmative
action: "special measures of protection or assistance for particular
2
groups designed to take into account the effects of discrimination." 111
While NAALC does contain gender specific language evincing a
commitment to women's rights, NAALC's aspirational goals with respect to gender equality are limited. In' The equal pay provision is defined as "equal wages for women and men by applying the principle of
equal pay for equal work in the same establishment."11 4 Notably, it
does not attempt to create wage parity for comparable work. The ban
on discrimination is "subject to certain reasonable exceptions, such as,
where applicable, bona fide occupational requirements or qualifica98. NAFTA Preamble, available at http://wwv.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/nafta/preamble.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
99. NAALC, supra note 10, at annex 1.
100. While equal pay and non-discrimination are critical to women's equality, I will
argue in Part V that an effective women's rights movement must put increasing focus on
the first three rights-the right to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike-so that
women workers can effectively participate as economic and political citizens, and enforce
their own rights.
101. NAALC, supra note 10, at annex I (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Here I mean only to look at NAALC's aspirational goals; I will examine the extent
to which NAALC's labor principles shape domestic law and translate into actual protections for workers, below.
104. See NAALC, supra note 10, at annex 1.
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tions and established practices or rules governing retirement ages,"
10 5
yet it does not specify how narrowly to interpret the exceptions.
Furthermore, while all of NAALC's enumerated principles are
critical to women, several equally important labor issues present in
other international law treaties are missing. The Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), for example, defines women's labor rights much more broadly. Unlike
NAALC, CEDAW states that women workers should be guaranteed social security, equal pay for work of equal value, maternity leave with
pay and without loss of benefits or seniority, and family health insurance. 11 6 While an international human rights treaty focused exclusively on women is perhaps not the most relevant metric against which
to compare NAALC-a side letter to a trade agreement applying to all
workers-some of the above labor rights principles are in fact present
in other international trade agreements. Article 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, for example, includes the right
to "equal pay for equal work."'1 7 Unlike NAALC, the European Union
Treaty does not limit the equal pay principle to work performed at the
"same establishment," and has in fact been interpreted by the European Court of Justice to encompass a right to equal pay for work of
equal value.10 8
B.

NAALC's Procedural Mechanism

In addition to setting out labor principles, the accord requires
each government to comply with and enforce its own labor law
through governmental action.1 9 NAALC obligates the signatories to
provide fair access to labor tribunals, requiring that each party provide a right of private action in its own courts and a measure of due
process."II Perhaps most importantly, the agreement establishes a new
forum for transnational action: Article 8 of NAALC creates the Commission for Labor Cooperation ("Commission"), which serves as the
main administrative body under the agreement.
105. Id.
106. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
G.A. Res. 54/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180
at art. 13 (1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
107. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 141, 1997 O.J.
(C340) 242.
108. SeeJohnson, supra note 28, at 857.
109. See NAALC, supra note 10, art. 3.
110. See NAALC, supra note 10, arts. 4, 5.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

The primary activity of the Commission is to promote cooperative
activities between the parties on a variety of issues, including "the
equality of men and women in the workplace" and "migrant workers
of the Parties."1 1' The mandate of the commission is thus broad and
open-ended, includes specific reference to women, and if run by active and aggressive leaders, could perhaps have an important role in
exposing labor rights abuses and gender discrimination. Yet, the Commission's activities to date have been limited. It has led some conferences and published a few reports that specifically addressed the
issues of women workers, such as the Trinational Conference on Women and Work in the 21st Century. 1 2 But, there is little evidence that
the Commission has tried to use its office to publicly pressure the governments in the direction of labor reform or expanded women's
rights. Beyond a few symposia and publications, the Commission has
engaged in little public activity.
In addition to establishing the Commission, NAALC requires
each of the three signatory countries to run a government appointed
National Administrative Office ("NAO") empowered to investigate allegations of non-compliance with NAALC's requirements alleged in
either of the other countries. I"' Under the NAALC system, organizations and individuals bring complaints to an NAO alleging ineffective
enforcement of law in one of the other nations; submissions are not
made in the country in which the alleged violation took place.' 14 This
structure is a compromise resulting from the opposition of Mexican
and Canadian negotiators to the creation of one supranational tribunal with enforcement powers, but the insistence of the United States
on some transnational review. As Lance Compa has written, "As a national entity that takes up labor rights outside the national territory,
the NAO is a unique institution. It has no counterpart under the
111. Id. at art. 11. The responsibilities of the governing body of the Commission, the
Council, include "promot[ing] cooperative activities between the Parties as appropriate
regarding occupational safety and health; child labor; migrant workers of the Parties; ...
social programs for workers and their families; ... labor management relations and collective bargaining procedures ... the equality of women." Id.; see also arts. 10, 12, 13, 16.
112. One of the commission's reports is entitled, "Employment of Women in North
America." See http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/ewna.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2003). For information about the conference see http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/bulletin2_8.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
113.

See NAALC, supra note 10, at art. 15 (1).

114. See id.at art. 16. ("Each NAO shall provide for the submission and receipt, and
periodically publish a list, of public commtnications of labor law matters arising in the
territory of another Party.") (emphasis added).
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NAFTA environmental side agreement, nor under any other labor
rights regime in Europe or elsewhere."' 15
In order to submit a complaint to an NAO, the petitioner does
not have to exhaust all domestic remedies. Generally, NAOs have only
required that the petitioner identify what domestic remedies have
been attempted and allege that domestic labor laws are not being effectively enforced.' 16 Once a submission is entered, the NAO has full
discretion over whether or not to accept the submission for review.
While the submission does not have to involve a corporation of any
particular national origin, in order to be subject to arbitration the sub1' 17
If
mission does have to allege that the violation is "trade related."
115. Compa, The First NAFT"A Labor Cases, supra note 27, at 159. However, when viewed
in light of American federalism, the NAO system seems less strange. It is not uncommon,
for example, for an American court to apply the law of another jurisdiction. See Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts to apply substantive state law in
diversity cases).
116. Telephone interview with Kevin Banks, Director of Office, Inter American Labor
Cooperation (Apr. 16, 2002); see also Sarah Lowe, The First American Case Under the North
American Labor Agreenent for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAMI L. Riv. 481, 486 (1997):
The international forum available under the NAALC does not require that domestic labor law remedies be exhausted, merely that actions and remedies to enforce domestic labor laws have been initiated. Thus the NAALC forum may
function as a concurrent alternative to the remedy sought in any of the member
nations so long as there is some credible evidence that a signatory country is not
enforcing its domestic labor laws.
Some business groups have pushed for a greater exhaustion requirement. See Diamond,
supra note 27, at 217; Isa, supra note 28, at 217 n.276. A review of NAALC submissions
reveals that NAOs have a great deal of discretion with regards to exhaustion. While failure
to exhaust domestic remedies has not been an issue in the majority of submissions, NAOs
have occasionally refused to hear a complaint because domestic procedures have not been
adequately attempted. For example in the Washington State Apples Case, Mex. NAO No.
9802, the Public Report explained:
In the case of the alleged violations of the rights of freedom of association and
collective bargaining of packing plant and warehouse employees, the Mexican
NAO, pursuant to NAALC article 5.8, performed no investigation. This was because the issue, as the petitioners themselves acknowledge, is still in the process of
being reviewed by the NLRB.
United States NAO regulations require that the petitioner describe whether "relief has
been sought under the domestic laws of another Party, and, if so, the status of any legal
proceedings." Labor Dept. Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660 § E (Apr. 7, 1994), at http://
(last visited
www.do.gov/dol/ilab/media/reports/nao/naalcgd.htm#StibmissionsProcess
Apr. 3, 2003).
117. NAALC, supra note 10, art. 29(1). Trade related is defined as "related to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete in the territory
of the Party whose labor law was the subject of ministerial consultations under Article 22,
with goods produced or provided by persons of another party." Id. at art. 49(1).
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an NAO accepts a submission for review it investigates and issues a
Public Report of Review.' 1
Should an NAO find that another signatory nation has failed to
enforce its domestic laws in violation of NAALC's principles, the NAO
may request ministerial consultations. With the exception of violations
of core labor rights-freedom of association, the right to bargain,. and
the right to strike-the NAO can also request an Evaluation Committee of Experts. Only for violations of occupational health and safety,
child labor, or minimum wage laws can an arbitral panel can be called
to resolve the dispute. ' 19
C.

Efficacy of NAALC

Theoretically, NAALC offers women a way to challenge ineffective enforcement of gender discrimination laws or labor laws, in violation of the above principles. In the years immediately following
NAALC's establishment, there was a degree of optimism among legal
scholars regarding the extent to which NAALC could serve as a vehicle for developing a regime of transnational labor rights. NAALC articulates a commitment from each party to "ensure that its labor laws
and regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent with high
quality and productive workplaces, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that light."2 1)Some scholars read this to suggest "astarting point for a charter of economic development based on
the protection of labor. While acknowledging the current national labor laws, [NAALC] attempts to provide a direction in which reform of
those laws must move."''M Applying this same logic, because of the
articulated principles of equal pay and non-discrimination, NAALC
can be read to demand that reform move in the direction of increasing women's rights, as well as toward protecting migrant workers and
the right to organize.
In addition, some scholars have suggested that NAALC provides a
vehicle to develop and implement international human rights and labor standards. Clyde Summers has argued:
To the extent that international conventions become a part of internal law, they create legal obligations under Article 3 of the
Agreement. The labor standards in international conventions are
118. See id.at art 21. Only in the United States does the investigation include a public
hearing. See U.S. NAO regulations at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/nao/naacgdhtm#SuibmissionsProcess (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
119. See NAALC, supra note 10, at arts. 21-23, 29.
120. NAALC, supra note 10, at pt. 2: Obligations, art. 2.
121. Diamond, supra note 27, at 215.
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largely parallel to those set out in the Labor Principles and thus
become more than goals or objectives; they become
legal obliga122
tions owed to the other parties to the Agreement.
The possibility that NAALC might incorporate international law
has interesting implications for gender rights, given that Canada and
Mexico, though not the United States, have ratified CEDAW. For example, in the Pregnancy Testing Case, submitted to the United States
NAO in 1997 by Human Rights Watch, the International Labor Rights
Fund, and Mexico's National Association of Democratic Lawyers, the
petitioners accused the Mexican government of failing to uphold
NAALC anti-discrimination principles and its own domestic law by
permitting widespread pregnancy-based discrimination in exportprocessing factories in northern Mexico. 12 3 The United States NAO
pointed to Mexico's ratification of CEDAW in its analysis of Mexican
domestic law. The NAO cited Article 11 (1) of CEDAW in support of
its conclusion that Mexico had discriminated against women in viola124
tion of NAALC.
Despite the moments of optimism regarding NAALC's ability to
expand enforceable labor and gender rights, the past years have revealed that there are serious structural flaws in NAALC that limit its
ability to redress violations of labor rights or achieve greater gender
equality.1 25 Specific cases make vivid the limits of NAALC's usefulness
122. Summers, supra note 27, at 184. But, as Summers acknowledges, this elevation
depends on whether a country has ratified international conventions. As such it is likely to
have a greater impact on Mexico than on the United States, as the United States remains a
non-signatory to most of the United Nations Human Rights treaties. See Hathaway, supra
note 42, at 111; see also United Nations treaties, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). Summers points out, however, that the ILO's
DeclarAtion of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted at its 18th annual
conference in June 1998 states that all members of ILO even if they have not ratified
conventions have obligations by virtue of ILO membership. "It is uncertain whether this
Declaration can make specific conventions binding on the US and Canada by virtue of
their ILO membership, so as to become a part of their internal law and thereby shape
obligations under NAALC." Summers, supra note 27, at 184.
123. See Pregnancy Testing Case, U.S. NAO 9701 (1997).
124. See Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 9701, at http://www.dol.gov/
ILAB/media/reports/nao/pubrep9701.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
125. Significant literature has discussed the limits of NAALC in protecting workers'
rights, though with little attention to gender. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 25 and 26;
see also LESLIE ROCKENBACH, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN BORDER: NAFTA AND GLOBAL LINKAGES (2001); TradingAway Rights, The Unfulfilled Promise of Nafta's Labor Side Agreement, Apr.
2001, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nafta/naftaO4Ol-O6.htm#P1075184618 (last
visited Apr. 3, 2003). Critics have also pointed to the failure of NAFTA to allow for increase
immigration as detrimental to worker rights. NAFTA, unlike the EU, does not provide for
the free flow of labor across borders. This puts downward pressure on Mexican wages by
restricting migration out of Mexico. Moreover, illegal migration creates downward pres-

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

as a remedial tool, especially when it comes to the right to organize.
For example, when the largely female workers of the Sony plant in
Nuevo Laredo who had been beaten and jailed for their support of an
independent union petitioned the United States NAO, the NAO responded by calling for public workshops in Mexico and private meeting between the two labor secretaries. No independent union was
recognized and no workers were ever reinstated.'12 ; Similarly, in the
Auto Trim/Breed Case,'1 the United States NAO ruled that Mexico had
inadequately enforced health and safety laws, resulting in serious illness, including birth defects.128 Yet no improvements in working conditions have occurred and no sanctions have been issued.
While NAALC aspires to protect the "right to organize" and to
assure workers a workplace of "non-discrimination," it does not articulate what those rights are, or create a cause of action for individual
workers when rights are violated. NAALC does not require any party
to amend its domestic laws to correspond to a standard that has been
generally agreed to by the Parties. The agreement recognizes "the
right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards." 1'2 9
The definition of labor principles emphasizes that the principles, including equal pay, right to organize, and non-discrimination, "do not
13
establish common minimum standards for their domestic law."'
Critics have contended that NAALC lacks a vehicle for improving
the labor laws of a country who remains recalcitrant in regards to generally recognized norms of behavior in the area of fundamental labor
rights, as long as that country applies its own laws.'"' Some argue that
it is the failure to "harmonize" the labor laws of the three countries
that limits NAALC's effectiveness. 13 2 However, harmonization of the
three nations' laws cannot necessarily be equated with improvement
sure on wages in Canada and the United States as it allows migrant workers to be exploited
to a degree that legal workers could not. See MooDY, supra note 14, at 127.
126. See Sony Case, U.S. NAO 940003; see also Richard Stevenson, Union Misgivings on
NAFI'A are Clinton's Latest Wony, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at Al; see generally ROCKENBACH,
supra note 125, at 75-79.
127. See Auto Trim/Breed Case, U.S. NAO 0001 (2000).
128. Public Report of Review of NAO Submissions No. 2000-01, available at http://
www.dol.org/ILAB/media/reports/nao/pubrep2000-1.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
129. NAALC, supra note 10, at art. 2. The core obligation assumed by Mexico, Canada,
and the United States under the agreement is to effectively enforce their own domestic
labor law. See id. at art. 3(1).
130. Id. at annex 1.
131. See Manuel Fuentes Muniz, The NAIZTA Labor Side Accord in Mexico and its Repercussions for Workers, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 393 (1995) ("Weak national laws are insulated
from reform as long as they are applied.").
132. See, e.g., Barbieri, supra note 28; Briones, supra note 28.
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of such laws. That is, it is just as possible that harmonization would
have resulted in a weakening of labor protections in Canada, and as a
strengthening in Mexico. The problem is not the failure to harmonize
labor law, but the failure to create strong and enforceable labor
rights.
In addition, the absence of a supranational tribunal to hear evidence and decide the guilt or innocence of alleged labor rights violators has further undermined NAALC's ability to make its labor
principles a reality. NAALC does not set up an international labor appeals court that can overrule domestic authorities. Contrast this to the
European Court of Justice in the European Union, which has the
power to review specific labor law violations and decisions by a member state's highest court. "" In the case of NAALC, an individual must
appeal to another country's NAO to investigate. Not only is this unusual in international law, it also raises concerns about expertise and
independence. Essentially, an administrative agency is asked to interpret the domestic laws of another country, laws with which it has little
34
experience. 1
Take, for example, the Mexican Pregnancy Testing Case.'13 5 In order to rule on whether Mexico had failed to enforce its own non-discrimination laws, the United States needed to make a determination
about Mexican domestic law; in so doing, it was faced with arguments
from the Mexican government that pre-employment testing did not
violate its labor law. The NAO contracted the services of an expert in
133. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 856 ("The ECJ is the final arbiter of whether a
Member-State has met its obligations under EU law. The ECJ is empowered to hear cases
referred to it from the highest domestic courts of the EU Member-States on matters that
implicate EU law.").
134. 1 do not mean to suggest that lack of expertise in itself is always a problem.
Though this structure is anomalous in international law, it is not uncommon for American
courts to apply the law of another jurisdiction. See supra note 115.
135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. According to Human Rights Watch,:
The petitioners submitted detailed documentation demonstrating that women
were routinely required to undergo pregnancy tests as a condition of employment, so that employers could screen out women who would require maternity
benefits if hired. Some women who became pregnant after being hired were also
pressured to quit their jobs. Petitioners also accused the government of failing to
meet the NAALC's article 4 requirement that victims of labor rights violations
have access to tribunals; under the Mexican government's interpretation of the
law, only people with an established work relationship can seek redress from labor tribunals, so a woman who is not hired because she is pregnant has no such
opportunity for redress.
HuM. RTS. WATCH REP., Trading Away Rights, The Unfuylled Promise of Nafta's Labor Side
Agreement, Apr. 2001, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001 /nafta/nafta0401-06.htm#
P1075_184618 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter TradingAway Rights].
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Mexican labor law and gender issues, held a public hearing, received
testimony from human rights legal experts, Mexican women, and the
Mexican government. Ultimately, the United States was unwilling to
conclusively interpret Mexican law. Instead, the NAO pointed to "differing opinions within the Government of Mexico on the constitutionality and legality of the practice" and recommended ministerial
consultations.' i
Under the NAALC system, not only is a judgment made by an
administrative agency of another country's executive branch without
expertise in the law it is reviewing, but there is also no independent
judicial officer bound by precedent. Rather, cases are heard by political appointees who are part of the executive branch. As a result, political considerations greatly shape the decisions of the NAOs.'-5 7 Lack of
independence may explain why the Commission has generally not
challenged governments and why NAOs have not aggressively investigated complaints or pursued remedies. For example, in February
2002, shortly after the Bush administration took over and promised a
new closeness with Mexico, the United States NAO declined even to
review a complaint that alleged the Mexican government had failed to
fulfill its commitment expressed in an earlier ministerial agreement to
promote free and fair union elections. Despite its earlier ruling, the
United States NAO stated that a review would not further the objectives of the NAALC and that there is no provision in Mexican labor
law governing the use of secret ballots in trade union representation
elections.8

Finally, and most critically, NAALC lacks effective enforcement
mechanisms. NAALC's procedures are slow and in most cases cannot
result in sanctions. The primary mechanism for resolving complaints
is negotiations between the governments. NAALC does not provide
remedies such as union certification, reinstatement, back wages or punitive damages. Rather, NAALC divides labor violations into three categories, each entitled to different remedies. For alleged violations of
all eleven of the labor principles, advocates can obtain a critical review
and report from a National Administrative Office in a country's labor
ministry, followed by direct consultations between ministers of labor.
136. See U.S. NAO Submission 9701, Public Report at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/
public/media/reports/nao/pubrep9701.htn (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
137. See Telephone Interview with Kevin Banks, Director of Office, Inter American Labor Cooperation (Apr. 16, 2002).
138. See U.S. NAO Public Report at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/summaryusa.htm#newl (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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But, only for violations of three of the eleven principles-violations of
a country's health and safety, child labor, and minimum wage lawscan advocates obtain binding remedies. For these, remedies are available at the end of a long dispute resolution process, and only when an
arbitral panel rules. To get to this final step in the NAALC process can
take nearly four years; no such penalty has yet been issued.' l 9
While health and safety, child labor, and minimum wage violations can theoretically result in sanctions, the only remedy available
for violations regarding forced labor, employment discrimination,
equal pay for men and women, migrant worker protection, and workers' compensation is a consultation and/or expert evaluation process.
Moreover, freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike are exempt from all the mechanisms
under the agreement except for the consultation process. Violations
of these rights cannot lead to any tangible legal sanction under
NAALC. For example, after an extensive investigation which produced substantial evidence that Mexican workers' right to freedom of
association, right to bargain, and right to strike had been violated by
Sony, the NAO made no definite findings and provided no remedy.140
Moreover, even the decision to call for a consultation process is discretionary. In the Honeywell case, in which several unions alleged that
twenty (female) workers had been fired by a Mexican maquiladora for
attempting to organize, the United States NAO declined to require
ministerial consultations and instead called for a series of cooperative
4
activities coordinated by the NAOs to discuss the right to organize.' 1
Contrast NAALC to NAFTA Chapter 11, which provides for resolution for corporate complaints, creates an independent cause of action, and includes significant remedies. Chapter 11 of NAFTA
provides that private investors on behalf of themselves or on behalf of
an enterprise, may directly sue a national government. Article 1116 of
NAFTA allows an individual to submit a claim to arbitration if s/he
believes a government has breached an obligation under the NAFTA
139. Business has been lobbying for an interpretation of NAALC that would require
exhaustion of domestic remedies, making resolution even less timely. See Diamond, sulra
note 27, at 217.
140. See Sony Case, U.S. NAO 940003; see also Summers, supra note 27, at 175-78.
141. See Honeywell Case, U.S. NAO 940001; see also Compa, NAFI'A's Labor Side Accord: A Three Year Accounting, supra note 27, at 13; Summers, supra note 27. However,
note that neither Summers, Compa, nor the submission itself mentions that the workers
fired were women. New accounts take note of the gender makeup of the workers. See e.g.,
Rob Ortega & Dianne Solis, Honeywell's Firingof Over 20 Women In Mexico May Test NAFTA,
Unions Say, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1993, at A4.
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and that the breach caused the investor to incur a loss or damage as a
result.142 While workers are unable to win compensation for labor violations through NAALC, corporations are able to win considerable
judgments when nations breach Chapter 1 1 .14" The comparison
reveals that NAFTA privileges the financial rights of corporations over
the economic and social needs of workers and their families. Women,
and especially women of color, concentrated in the lowest paid and
most vulnerable workplaces, are particularly impacted by the failure of
NAFTA to accord labor rights the same importance as corporate
rights.
D.

NAALC's Expressive Function

Despite NAALC's failure to provide an effective forum for the enforcement of labor rights, the past years have shown that the agreement nonetheless wields expressive power and can serve an important
function when used as part of a broader organizing and political campaign. NAALC's articulation of "labor principles" gives labor standards a salience with a moral claim, 144 while its gender specific
principles give moral force to demands for women's equality. The
NAO hearing process can be used as a forum to give voice to such
claims, and potentially makes each governmental party confront its
own failures. In this way, NAALC has been a useful tool for unions
and human rights groups, in building cross-border connections, in increasing publicity about labor rights violations, and as a means to exercise political pressure. 145 While the Sony workers, for example, did
not win their independent union, they were able to use the NAALC
procedures to focus international attention on corporate and governmental labor abuses. Using this public attention, and with the support
of American counterparts, independent unions, with significant participation by women workers, have more strength in Mexico than ever
before.
142. SeeNAFTA, supranote 10, atch. 11, Art. 1116. Chantell Taylor, NAFI'A, GAiT and
the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standardfor Workers'Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 401. (2000), available at http://www.chantelltaylor.net (last visited Apr. 10,
2003).
143. In 1999, Metalclad, a United States corporation, won a $16.7 million judgment
from an arbitral panel that found Mexico to be in violation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
Mexico appealed and the suit was later settled for $16 million. See David Hechler, U.S. Firm
Gets $16M Settlement, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2002, at Al 7.
144. See Summers, supra note 27, at 187.
145. See Compa, Nafta's Labor Side Accord: A Three Year Accounting, supra note 27, at
21-22.
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The expressive value of NAALC applies to gender specific norms
as well. The Mexican Pregnancy Testing Case, which reveals both the
potential and the limits of NAALC, demonstrates that little concrete
remedy came from the United States NAO:
After holding a public hearing in November 1997, the U.S. NAO
published a report on the topic in January 1998. The report criticized the practice of pressuring pregnant women to quit theirjobs,
but stopped short of condemning the practice of pre-hire pregnancy testing. The NAO recommended ministerial consultations
"for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of the protections
against pregnancy-based gender discrimination afforded by Mexico's laws and their effective enforcement by the appropriate institutions." As a result of the consultations, several conferences were
held-in Mexico and the United
States-to address issues related
14 6
to women's rights at work.
Yet, groups were able to use the process to generate pressure on
the Mexican government, eventually leading the Mexican government
to change its interpretation of its own domestic law. The Mexican government argued throughout the NAALC process that pregnancy testing did not violate Mexican law, but ultimately Mexican authorities
publicly stated that such testing did in fact breach domestic standards. 147 According to Human Rights Watch, the organization that
documented the discrimination and brought the complaint, "The
NAALC complaint process validated activists and women workers in
their own fight to bring attention to this problem and to seek to stop
it." 148
Thus, the Pregnancy Testing Case suggests that, despite its remedial
limits, NAALC's expressive principles and its public forum can be
used as a tool for transnational norm development and cross-border
organizing on the part of women's rights groups and labor groups.
NAALC can provide a new space to articulate a broader vision of women's labor rights before an international audience and can help de146. Trading Away Rights, sufpra note 132 (it http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nafta/
nafta04Ol-06.htm#P1075_184618 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
147. See Letter from Alexis Herman, Secretary of Labor, toJos6 Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director of the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch (May 5, 1999); letter from
Irasema Garza, secretary of the United States NAO, to Jos6 Miguel Vivanco (August 30,
1999), cited in Trading Away Rights, supra note 132. According to Human Right Watch:
Describing statements made at a conference in Mexico sponsored as part of the
ministerial agreement on the case, Herman wrote, "In particular, the Mexican
officials explained the view that employment discrimination, both pre- and posthire, on the basis of gender and pregnancy are illegal under Mexican law and
would not be tolerated."
Id.
148. Trading Away Rights, supra note 132.
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velop cross-border networks among women's rights groups. However,
although NAALC has now been in existence for eight years, women's
voices and concerns are largely absent from the NAALC submissions
and reports. There have been twenty-five total submissions since the
NAALC was created in 1994. 149 Only one-the Mexican Pregnancy Testing Case-specifically mentions women. 51 This is particularly striking
given the fact that women make up the majority of workers in export
processing zones-the subject of most NAALC complaints. News accounts of the Honeywell case, for example, reveal that the twenty workers fired for organizing were all women. 15 1 Similarly, while a large
percentage of migrant workers in the United States are women, the
submissions dealing with migrant workers make no reference to gender. 5 2 Most of these submissions have been filed by unions and
15
human rights NGOs.
Meanwhile, American women's rights groups have virtually ignored NAALC as a locus for addressing the struggles of women workers, and have not been actively involved in helping to organize women
workers. No cases have been filed regarding the rights of women
workers in America. Although NAALC's labor principles open up a
possibility for women's groups to challenge unequal pay and sex discrimination, with the exception of the Pregnancy Testing Case, these
principles have never been raised in the submissions. No cases have
been filed under NAALC alleging violations of the equal pay principle. Moreover, women's groups have not joined any of the petitions
focusing on core labor rights.

149. See List of Public Communications, at http://labour.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/psait-spila/
aicdt-ialc/pc-naalc/summnary/index.cfin/doc/English (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). Sixteen
have been filed with the United States NAO, six with the Mexican NAO, and three with the
Canadians.
150. See U.S. NAO 9701.
151. See Ortega & Solis, supla note 138, at A4.
152. See Department of Labor Case, Can. NAO 98-2, Mex. NAO 98-04; Washington
State Apple Case, Mex. NAO 98-02.
153. Submitters include the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United Electrical Workers of America, the International Labor Rights Fund, The American Friends
Service Committee, the Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Communication Workers
of America, Human Rights Watch, Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, the United
Steelworkers, Yale University School of Law Workers' Rights Project, and the ACLU. See
Summary of Public Communications, at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/
pccharten.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).

Spring 2003]

V.

NAFTA AND NAALC

Looking Forward

The time since NAFTA's signing has made clear that globalization is not a passing phase in our economic system, and that this
global restructuring has particular impact for women workers. It is
critical that those concerned about gender equality-begin to engage in
and support cross-border labor organizing campaigns, and, when possible, exploit NAALC's expressive capabilities. Moreover, such groups
must begin to advocate for the creation of stronger, more effective
transnational labor agreements. Such organizing efforts and transnational legal provisions are essential to the existence of democracy,
workers' rights, and gender equity in an increasingly transnational
economy. As international law experts have argued, NAALC confronts
one of the central tensions now facing the world:' that which exists
between nationally organized democratic regulatory frameworks and
the emerging transnational nature of economic life.' 54 Moreover, as
often ignored by international law and NAFTA experts, this tension
55
has gendered roots and effects.'1
Eight years after the passage of NAVFA, there are hopeful signs,
at least in terms of citizen efforts to shape trade debates while connecting gender to economic rights. Faced by a sharp decline in union
membership caused by the flight of the manufacturing industry, unions have increased their focus on organizing women and immigrants
in the growing service sector. Shortly after the passage of NAFTA, a
political struggle within the labor movement broke out. A dissident
group of union leaders, expressing frustration with years of membership decline, was elected to the leadership of the federation in the
first contested election in the AFL-CIO's history. 15" The new slate was
headed byJohn Sweeney of the largely female and immigrant Service
Employees International Union, Richard Trumka, former president
of the United Mine Workers of America, and Linda Chavez Thompson, a Mexican-American immigrant and the child of farmworkers.

154. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 200.
155. As I have argued throughout this paper, an accurate evaluation of the efficacy of
the current system, and effective development of new models, depend on the recognition
that the majority of workers being affected by the global economy are women and that they
are being affected differently because they are women.
156. See, e.g., JoAnn Wypijewski, Labor's Challenge, THE N,-riON, Nov. 20, 1995, at 17;
Robert A. Jordan, A Labor March Would Send A Mighty Message, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29,
1995, at 61.
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The new leadership promised increased militancy and more progres57
sive politics. 1
Subsequently, the AFL-CIO has built an active new department
focusing on women's rights, nationally and internationally. 58 Unions
such as the Service Employees International Union have focused intensely on organizing in female-dominated industries such as health
care and homecare. Indeed, two out of three new union members are
women.159. With increasing numbers of women in unions, the number
of women in leadership positions is also increasing. The national federation has begun taking public stands in support of women's rights
legislation, publicly endorsing national legislation for contraceptive
equity and to protect survivors of domestic violence from unemployment and insurance discrimination, for example."!"
In addition, acutely aware of the diminished power of workers
with respect to multinational corporations, parts of the American labor movement, particularly the United Electricalworkers and the
Steelworkers, are beginning to engage in more international crossborder organizing, working directly with women in the maquiladoras.'"' NAALC has facilitated these cross-border efforts.'16 2 Further, the AFL-CIO has dramatically revised its position on
immigration, putting new emphasis on the rights of immigrant workers rather than on narrow protectionism.16 3 Although there is much
more progress to be made within the labor movement, and although
unions face significant obstacles to organizing, changes enacted since
1 64
the passage of NAFTA are promising.
157. See Peter T. Kilborn, Why Labor Wants the Tired and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1995, (Week in Review), at 3 (describing labor's new commitment to organizing the poor
and engaging in social activism).
158. See AFL-CIO, Women's Dept., http://www.aflcio.org/women/workers-rights.htm
(last visited June 17, 2002).
159. See AFL-CIO, Workers' Rights are Women's Rights, at http://www.aflcio.org/women/workers-rights.htm (last visited june 17, 2002).
160. See AFL-CIO, 2001b Stopping Domestic Violence at Work (Aug. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.aflcio.org/publ/estatements/ju2001/violence.htm
(last visited June 17,
2002). However, it is not clear whether the issue comes up in practice with union leaders at
workplaces implementing the recommendations of the position paper.
161. See Ansley, supra note 23, at 220 n.4.
162. See Compa, A Three Year Accounting, supra note 27, at 21-23.
163. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Urges Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2000, at A26 (describing the AFL-CIO's February 16 resolution to call for blanket amnesty for illegal immigrants).
164. 1 do not mean to suggest that unions have solved problems of sexism or racism in
their ranks, nor that they have effectively implemented a vision of social unionism, only
that many are moving in this direction.
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While unions have moved in the right direction, so too have women's groups. Although few women's groups have been involved in
active organizing campaigns, such as the campaigns that brought complaints under NAALC, women's NGOs have become much more active in the trade debate. Since NAFTA's passage, new NGOs have
formed that are focused on trade and women workers' rights. There
are now more than thirty organizations doing advocacy and policy
work around women's issues in the global economy. 16 5 Even traditional, well-established women's organizations are beginning get involved in the issue. In May of 2002, the League of Women Voters
reassessed its stance on trade, for the first time since 1973, calling specific attention to the need to improve labor conditions and guarantee
core labor rights. 166 The National Council of Jewish Women formed
the No Sweatshop Coalition ("NOSCO") after their conference on
sweatshops in October 1996.167 Major national women's groups, including NOW and Feminist Majority recently wrote a letter to Speaker
16 8
Hastert arguing against the renewal of fast-track trade authority.
Such advocacy work, merging issues of trade and gender, focusing specifically on women workers in the global economy is critically
important. However, much of the current NGO work posits the women as victims of exploitation and sexual harassment at work, rather
than as actors engaged in their own organizational efforts; it decides
priorities and advocates policies on behalf of working women, rather

165. For a description of many such organizations see Center for Concern's website at
http://www.coc.org/focus/?D=907&show=Related_Links#rights
(last visited Apr. 3,
2003). Two groups that are focused particularly on Mexican women workers and NAFTA
based trade are the Canadian based Maquiladora Solidarity Network at http://
www.maquilasolidarity.org/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2003), and the American based Coalition
forJustice in the Maquiladoras. See also International Gender and Trade Network at http:/
/www.genderandtrade.net (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) ("[A]n international network of gender advocates working to promote equitable, social and sustainable trade," believing that,
"[i]n the current international trading system, women have been turned into producers
and consumers of traded commodities and are even traded commodities themselves.").
166. See Trade Promotion Authority, Memorandum from Carolyn Jefferson-Jenkins,
President, League of Women Voters, to Members of the United States Senate (May 2,
2002), available at http://www.lwv.org/join/trade/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). The title of
the League of Women Voters' 34th Annual Symposium on International Relations, held at
the Yale Law School on March 19, 2002, was The Ordinay Citizen. and Globalization.
167. The New York section went on to organize two no-sweat shopping days. See http://
www.wccny.org/nosco/nosco.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
168. See Against NAFTA, Letter to Speaker Hastert, at http://www.cwa3204.org/
legnews/1005871269.html (last visitedJune 17, 2002). The letter was also signed by a wide
array of union, church groups, civic organizations, and environmental groups.
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than furthering the rights of those women, as workers, to organize
69
and to determine their own priorities.
The focus on working women as victims in need of someone to
speak for them is not only normatively troubling, it is also practically
limited. It occludes the importance of worker organizations. Unionization strongly correlates with economic gains for workers, and to some
extent with social rights such as child-care, health care, and paid family leave. 17 1 Union membership raises median weekly earnings of
American workers and reduces gender based income gaps. Overall,
women who are members of a labor union earn over 30% more than
their non-union counterparts; African American women earn 38%
more and Latina women 41% more than non-union women of the
same ethnic or racial background.' 7 ' In addition, union membership
decreases the wage gap between men and women by more than
10%. 172 Union workers are also much more likely to have health care
and pension benefits than non-union workers. 73 Thus, a vital labor
movement in transnational female workplaces such as Mexican maquiladoras and the American service sector, is critical for advancing women's economic and social rights.
Moreover, facilitating organization is essential to furthering democracy and workers' ability to participate in and affect democratic
political culture. Workplace organizations, like other voluntary associations, enable civic participation and strengthen democracy. As
Theda Skorpol, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson write:
Public life in the United States has long been rooted in voluntary
membership groups as well as competitive elections. From
churches and unions to social groups and reform crusades, membership associations have provided paths into active citizenship, al169. See, e.g., NOW Joins Fight for Strawberry Pickers' Rights (an. 1997) at http://
www.now.org/nnt/O1-97/berry.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (describing NOW's alliance
with union groups on the issue of sexual harassment among migrant workers). For a critique of advocacy and academic work that posits the woman as victim see Ratna Kapur, The

ragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject in International/Post-colonial
Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. j. 1 (2002).
170. For a comparative example of the correlation between unions and economic and
social rights for women see Francine Blau & Lawrence Kahn, THE GENDER PAY GAP 8,
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5664, Sum. 2001), availableat
http://www.nber.org/papme/w7732.pdf (last visited April 11, 2003).
171. See Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001), at http://www/
bls.gov/cps/cpswom2000.pdf (last visited June 17, 2002). Union membership also reduces
the wage gap on race and ethnic lines alone. African Americans workers in unions earn
37% more and Latinos 55% more.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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lowing Americans to build community, pursue shared goals, and
17 4
influence social and political affairs.

The right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the
right to strike run parallel to basic American political rights-the
right to assemble, the right to freedom of speech, and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances. Unions are some of
the most formally democratic institutions in American society, aside
from actual elected bodies. They can be a space where workers learn

about democracy first-hand, and, as a result, they tend to foster
greater political participation. 75 Moreover, unions have historically
constituted a fundamental basis for a progressive coalitions in American politics.' 76 Thus, unionization in female-dominated industries has
the potential not only to improve women's economic conditions, but
also to give them a collective voice through which to exercise power in
the democratic process.
Skopol, Ganz, and Munson warn us that the precipitous decline
of organizational life in American society has dangerous implications
for democracy. They urge Americans to "reimagine their democratic
future and look to revitalize their shared and representative institutions not just in national politics but in associational life as well."' 17 7
174. Theda Skogpol, Marshall Ganz & Ziad Munson, A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Ongins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States, 94 AM. POL. ScL. REV. 527 (2000); see
also Theda Skocpol, Storrs Lectures, Yale Law School (2002).
175. See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970)
(concluding that workers who have a meaningful role in decision-making at work develop
a sense of political efficacy that may make them more active citizens in the project of selfgovernance). See also Thomas Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHII-KENT L. REV. 229, 230
(arguing that membership organizations such as unions teach us "the habits necessary to
sustain democratic political life"). For further discussions see Kate E. Andrias, Note, A
Robust PoliticalDebate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming, 2003).
176. See DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 199-239 (1993) (discussing the
role of unions in politics beginning with the New Deal); JOSHUA FREEMAN, WORKING CLASS

NEW YORK 55-71 (2000) (describing how during the years after World War II the labor
movement led New York city toward a social democratic political regime). At times, particularly during the Cold War and the Vietnam era, the labor movement as a whole was less
allied with progressive politics and followed a more narrow, business unionism model.
However, even then, certain local unions played an important part in progressive political
coalitions. See, e.g., LEON FINK & BRIAN GREENBERG, UPHEAVAL IN THE QUIET ZONE: A HISTORY OF HOSPITAL WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 1199 184-189 (1989) (analyzing the role of the

hospital workers' union in the civil rights movement and in progressive politics during the
1960s when most other unions were viewed as conservative and complacent by the American Left); Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, OpportunitiesFound and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. AM. HIST. 768 (arguing that organized black
workers were in the vanguard of efforts to transform race relations in the South in the
1950s).
177. Skogpol, Ganz & Munson, supra note 174, at 547.
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Reconsidering their words in light of NAFTA, NAALC, and the current global economy, suggests that we must "re-imagine" organizational life not only nationally, but internationally. Foremost in the
agenda of rights activists-human rights, women's rights, and labor
rights alike-as well as that of sympathetic legal scholars must be to
create transnational legal norms that strengthen civic participation
and democratic structures. In short, efforts should focus on shaping
trade agreements so that they protect the rights of workers to build
effective labor organizations across borders. Only if NAALC and similar agreements include stronger organizational rights will they play a
critical role in reestablishing democratic life on a transnational basis,
allowing women to finally decide for themselves what rights they
deserve.

